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Herbicides Used In Vietnam
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Yearly Herbicides Used In Vietnam

DECLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS

A. Memo from Robert H Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the Pres's Dep'y Special Asst for National Security Affairs (Rostow) Washg'tn, 11-17-61, Secret

D. Memo From the Asst Director, Far East (Neilson) to the Director of the US Info Agency [USIA] (Murrow); Washg'tn, 11-17-61, SECRET

G. Telegram From the Dept of State (Ball) to the Embassy in Saigon (Nolting), Washg'tn, 12-14-61, 8:02pm, SECRET; Priority

J. CINCPAC (Felt), to Chief MAAG V'nam (McGarr), Honolulu, 12-28-61, 12:45pm, TOP SECRET

N. Memo from the SecState (Rusk) to the Pres (Kennedy), Washg'tn, 11-24-61, TOP SECRET

1. Memo from Robert H Johnson of the National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Use of defoliants in V'nam

It seems to we that if we are going to cope successfully with charges that we are engaged in germ or poison gas warfare, we must make the gen'l character of the ops as open and above board as possible, would it be possible to get the ICC to examine every drum of the defoliant mixture to determine that it is what we say it is? If we are going to pursue the policy of letting the ICC find out itself whether we are violating the Geneva Accord's, this may be impossible. It may be difficult, in any event, to get the ICC to agree to any such action. An alternative approach would be to bring in some other international group or perhaps a group of private scientists. Publicity ought to emphasize the fact (I believe it is a fact) that the chemical agents involved are the same kind that are used by farmers against weeds. I think that the adverse political consequences of the operation would also be less if this is not the 1st concrete move that is announced in connection with our stepped-up effort in V'nam. If it could be put in the context of a comprehensive story of what we plan to do and why we plan to do it, we shall be much better off. There is some danger that NV, which has already got hold of our gen'l plans and begun a propaganda operation, can exploit this operation to the point where its propaganda would be a quite effective backfire against our subsequent charges of DRV involvement in the South. It seems to ale important that this question be got to the Pres on an urgent basis, possibly this weekend, no later than Monday. [11-20] If we are not going ahead we ought to stop our preparatory efforts quickly. Otherwise we may pay many of the political costs while reaping no military advantages. The cost estimates on this program seem to have gone upward continuously. Whereas earlier this week I understood that the total cost was on the order of $4 million ($1 million for chemicals and $3 million for air transport), I now understand that it may be on the order of $10.15 million. This estimate is for just the political phase operation-the attack on the food supplies. Often estimates have put total possible cost of the 3-phase program at $70 million or more. I think that these figures raise serious questions with respect to the comparative value of this as opposed to other measures we might take in V'nam. As you probably know, subsequent phases would involve selective defoliation in Zone D and of the communications routes between Saigon and other key cities and defoliation along the Cambodian border. If I understand a recent Dept telegram correctly, we have in mind defoliating an area near, but not on, the border, but at a constant distance from it. Will this accomplish the purpose? I am not certain whether the Pres is being asked to approve all 3 phases. Politically, the defoliation of areas around Zone D and along the roads to the principal cities would seem to present least difficulties. If we should decide against the operation directed at VC crops, we might still decide go ahead with Zone D and roadside operation. The principal political danger in it may be to turn non-communist villagers whose crops are accidentally destroyed against the govt. That is, of course, 1 of the political drawbacks of all 3 proposed phases. I would recommend that, since State and Defense are now to discuss the the subject this afternoon, [see footnote 1] they might consider preparing a joint paper for the Pres. The Defense draft ought clearly to state the technical military case for case. (A bootleg copy of a draft [not found] which I have seen did not,) The State draft ought to discuss the political problems in the area and worldwide. Relevant recent cable traffic is attached.

Footnote 1: This discussion took place at the Dept of State at 2pm on 11-17 and included U Alexis Johnson, William Bundy, and Rostow, among others.

FROM THE ASST DIRECTOR, FAR EAST (NEILSON)

A note on the source text indicates that copies were sent to Wilson, Sorenson (IOP), and Slaton (IAF). The source text is Sorenson's copy and bears his typewritten name in the margin and the handwritten notation, "JCS. Must reading. BY." "BY" has not been identified.

SUBJECT: Use of Defoliants in V'nam

I am informed that the DOD has drafted a memo to the White House seeking the Pres's decision on the use of defoliants in V'nam. [see 264 file] The SecState's concurrence is to be sought before submission to the Pres. A member of my staff saw the memo in the V'nam Task Force office yesterday. No copies were available. The memo, briefly, lists 2 principal objectives in using defoliants: Deny food to VC units; establish a denuded area along V'nam borders (with Cambodia, or Laos, or both) to check VC infiltration. Also listed are negative factors, mainly psychological, which should be taken into consideration in the decision-making process. The status of this controversial subject thus is: The Govt of V'nam, the US Country Team in Saigon and the Dept of Defense urge employment of defoliant as an effective tactic to hinder VC depredations. In proposing the action, consideration was given to 8o-called public relations or psychological factors, for instance, tests on foliage in or around Saigon would be made publicly to demonstrate that the chemicals employed are not harmful to humans and animals; the GVN itself would mount a publicity campaign explaining the security benefits which would accrue; unmarked aircraft piloted by "civilians" would be employed at spraying flights to guard against charges that "American military adventurists" are involved; etc. I don't know whether the following factors have been taken into consideration thus far in the decision-making process in Washg'tn: (1) The use of chemical weaponry in an Asian country could create such a storm of criticism that possible short-range military advantages on the ground in V'nam might be outweighed by a harvest of ill-will deleterious to certain long-ranged goals in V'nam and the region SEA. (2) The communist bloc will, of course, make great propaganda capital of this undertaking by "the US and its stooge Diem." We all recall the propaganda circus created by the communists on alleged US use of "germ warfare" in Korea on the basis of fabricated evidence. I am no military strategist or tactician, although I did learn a few things about chemical or bacteriological warfare (most of it hair-raising) at the Air War College. Perhaps defoliation can be a critical factor in exposing VC strongholds and destroying VC food supplies. If it is; and must be used, we can take the psychological bumps which are certain to be dealt to us. But the spectre of charges that "US imperialists are waging germ warfare on Asians" haunts me. The decision is to be left to the Pres. I recommend you discuss the subject in its varied ramifications with Walt Rostow.

FROM THE DEPT OF STATE (BALL) TO THE EMBASSY IN SAIGON (NOLTING)

Drafted by Heinz and Wood, cleared with Cottrell, DOD/ISA, and USIA, and initialed by Harriman for the Acting Sec'y. Also sent to CINCPAC for PolAd

781. Joint State-Defense message. Task Force/VN. Subject: Defoliants.

Defense prepared give go-ahead to 1st stage defoliant ops upon receipt from CINCPAC of plans and Washg'tn approval for 1st stage of operation. Decision is that 1st ops undertaken will be clearance of jungle growth along roads and trails used by ARVN for tactical ops. SecDef has stated that he desires these ops commence as soon as plans receive Washg'tn (Defense and State) approval. in anticipation press inquiries re use defoliant for jungle road clearance, we propose reply following lines: Noting communist guerillas use roadside underbrush to ambush civilian buses, trucks, and passenger cars, making roads unsafe for daily travel by people of the country, GVN has asked US for assistance in program of clearance of jungle growth along roads of V'nam, US equipment will be used. Road clearance will aid the ARVN in patrolling roads to protect people and will facilitate normal maintenance. Operation involves use of materials which are similar those used every day for weed clearance rights of way in the US. As our people know from experience, these defoliants of the 2-4D variety are not handful to humans, animals, or the soil. Since there are miles of jungle roads in V'nam, US planes and personnel are actively cooperating in this jungle growth clearance operation. C-123 type planes are being used. They are piloted by US crews in uniform. Your comments requested on above proposed statement which we suggest would also be used in Saigon by US agencies in response to expected queries there. Deptel 556 [not found] and Airgram CA-623 [see footnote 1] propose certain procedures for GVN. We would suggest that matter of informing South V'namese people be responsibility of the GVN. Since defoliant is harmless to personnel and animals, we intend to play it in a low key although we feel it will make a definite contribution to counter-guerrilla ops. (on lines para A, 1 CA-623) [see footnote 2] We believe it important to emphasize that in this operation we are merely clearing jungle growth along the sides of roads, that we are not attacking any human targets, and that its primary purpose is to prevent the guerrilla forces from utilizing this jungle cover for ambushing V'namese forces. We also anticipate that the ground work laid in connection with this jungle road clearance operation will establish a framework within which we can combat future Communist propaganda blasts for other phases of defoliant ops, i.e., tactical Zone D, border clearance and eventually food denial.

Footnote 1: Dated 12-8, it contained the V'nam Task Force's suggestions regarding publicity in connection with the use of defoliants.

Footnote 2: This paragraph dealt with defoliation along roads. It reads "Action preceded by low key provincial level announcement emphasizing this normal procedure keep road shoulders clear underbrush and tying action to road maintenance effort. Mimeographed announcement including statement that spray harmless to man, animals, and soil for distribution inhabited areas near roads. Before undertaking overall road clearance project large-scale trial run should be undertaken, after proper publicity, and popular reaction to trial pin assessed."

CINCPAC (FELT), TO CHIEF MAAG V'NAM (MCGARR)

Repeated to the JCS, JACE AJCC, PACAF, and Navy GRNC.

282245Z. Defoliant ops, A. ChMAAG V'nam 160451Z.

B. CHMAAG V'nam 220359Z. C. CINCPAC 232135Z. [see footnote 1]

1. In order to respond to decision made at SecDef meeting 12-16, a defoliant plan is required which clearly sets forth the objective of the operation and specific areas for the initial operation. Refs A and B contain basic data but are not selective enough. Our concept is that a defoliant operation should be developed with the following purposes in mind:

A. To assist the counter-insurgency operation [CI op] by clearing lines of communication in support of current or projected campaigns.

B. To enhance capabilities for aerial observation of selected areas in VC controlled territory.

C. To assist in clearing fields of fire and to increase observation order to decrease the likelihood of close-in ambushes.

2. The initial defoliant operation should be designed with above purposes in mind, but with limited specific objectives in order to provide us with an opportunity to evaluate its success and thereby to determine advisability of further ops.

3. With foregoing in mind, I have developed following plan for initial limited objective defoliating ops:

"1. Situation: The RVNAF is preparing to implement a campaign to eliminate the VC in specified provinces throughout RVN. To assist these ops, action has been taken to provide for the initial employment of chemical defoliants to clear vegetation along key lines of communication (LOC to be used in the CI ops. This plan provides for the conduct of an initial defoliant operation.

2. Mission: to clear vegetation to a distance of 200 meters on both sides of key LOC by means of aerial and ground spray ops in support of current AC projected CI campaigns and to determine the success of such ops.

3. Operations: (map ref: Indochina and Thailand 1:250,00 AMS series L509, sheets NC 48-3, 48-4, 48-7 and 48-8).

A. Concept:

(1) The operation will involve the systematic clearance of vegetation along key highways and access roads to be used as LOCS by SVN forces conducting CI ops. Priority will be given to clearing vegetation along lines of communication (LOC) between seat of govt and key cities to include roads peripheral to zone D. Defoliant ops will be conducted with both US and SVN forces using ground and aerial spray equipment. Aerial spray ops will be conducted by US aircraft, w/USAF markings, manned by US personnel under PACAF control and with V'namese-manned H-34 helicopters equipped with Hidal spraying rig. Ground spray equipment will be manned and operated by RVNAF personnel.

(2) USAF transport aircraft with aerial spray equipment will operate from Tan Son Nhut. USAF aircraft will be crewed by USAF personnel except that Commander 2nd ADVON will be that crews are augmented with RVNAF personnel to assist in identification of target areas. Commander 2nd ADVON will control air defoliant ops conducted by US aircraft and coordinate the SVN helicopter ops through K AOC established in the vicinity of Tan Son Nhut.

(3) Specific missions, method of spraying and the time of execution will be determined by ChMAAG based upon the needs of Commanders responsible for the conduct of CI ops. ChMAAG will submit air mission requirements to Commander 2nd ADVON who will determine the feasibility of the mission in view of available resources, weather and other limiting factors. ChMAAG will determine the feasibility and coordinate the execution of spraying ops conducted by the RVNAF with vehicle mounted spray equipment. Where feasible, target areas will be designated and adequately marked by GVN personnel using colored markers, balloons, helicopters or other means that will be readily identified by forces, air or ground, conducting the defoliant operation. V'namese personnel will be utilized to the maximum extent possible in the handling of chemicals for the defoliant operation to include delivery of defoliants to the spray aircraft under control of Commander 2nd ADVON.

(4) This phase of the operation will not include spraying of "food crops, and action will be taken to ensure that such areas are avoided. In addition, cover [for] the deception ops designed to deny the Communists propaganda material will be conducted. These ops should provide for a logical explanation on the use of defoliant as a non-military venture for improvement and maintenance of transportation networks.

B. Conduct of ops when directed, defoliant ops will be conducted in the following areas in the priority indicated.

Footnote 1: Reference C is printed as 61COUPC file, paper 2. References A and B have not been found.

ROM THE SECSTATE (RUSK) TO THE PRES (KENNEDY)

Wash'tn, 11-24-61, Top Secret

A handwritten note on the source text indicates that the "original" was given to Rostow and the "enclosure" to McGeorge Bundy. A draft of the memo, prepared by U Alexis Johnson, was submitted to the Sec'y of State for his Signature under cover of a memo of 11-22, in which Johnson wrote: "The key is not making this an operation in itself but carefully coordinating it with and making it an incidental part of larger ops for resettlement of the Montagnards, the setting up of an effective border control force, and the ability to mount an effective military operation in Zone D. We must also stay away from the term 'chemical warfare' and any connection with the Chemical Corps, and rather talk about 'weed killers'.

Subject: Defoliant ops in V'nam

I concur with the attached memo from Gilpatric on the foregoing subject. The use of defoliant does not violate any rule of international law concerning the conduct of chemical warfare and is an accepted tactic of war. Precedent has been established by the British during the emergency in Malaya in their use of helicopters for destroying crops by chemical spraying. We will, of course, be the object of an intense Communist "germ warfare" campaign which may be picked up by some neutrals. You will recall that this was the case during the Korean war although the communist charges had no factual basis whatever. On the other hand, I am satisfied that successful plant-killing ops in V'nam, carefully coordinated with and incidental to larger ops, can be .of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the VC. Carrying out of the operation will be carefully planned and coordinated between State, Defense, USIA, CINCPAC, the Country Team, and the GVN. Detailed plans in this regard have been formulated. Therefore, I recommend that you approve the undertaking of such ops in accordance with Paragraph 8 (b) of Gilpatric's memo; that is, "to go ahead with a selective and Carefully controlled program starting with the clearance of key routes, proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D and the border areas until we have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation." I also concur in Gilpatric's recommendation that this should be done only after careful prior consideration and authorization from Washg'tn of the plans developed by CINCPAC and the Country Team."

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